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Regan v. Wald and the Grandfather
Clause of the Trading with the Enemy
Act: A Lesson in Explicit Vagueness
I. Introduction
In Regan v. Wald,' the Supreme Court reinstituted the Rea-
gan Administration's curbs on travel-related transactions with
Cuba. The Court decided that the Treasury Department acted
with statutory authority when it issued currency control regula-
tions designed to deprive Cuba of U.S. currency. The regula-
tions," issued in 1982, were challenged on the ground that the
Executive failed to comply with the procedures of the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).3 Those proce-
dures, enacted in 1977, substantially curtailed the President's
power to impose a peacetime economic embargo against another
country.
Rather than lifting all existing embargoes, Congress in-
cluded a grandfather clause in conjunction with the 1977 amend-
ment to section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914
(TWEA) 4 that allowed the President to retain the "authorities"
that "were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1,
1977."' In a five to four decision, the Court held that this grand-
father clause provided an adequate statutory basis for the 1982
amendment.6 This decision preserved the Executive's power to
exercise authority under the TWEA.
This Note examines the Court's decision in light of the leg-
islative history of the 1977 amendment to section 5(b) of the
TWEA and the enactment of the IEEPA. Part II presents the
1. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
2. Certain Transactions Incident to Travel to and within Cuba, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,030
(1982) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1984)).
3. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (1977)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982)).
4. Id. § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625-26, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (1982).
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
6. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3039.
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history of the TWEA, its 1977 amendments, and the enactment
of the IEEPA. It also discusses the Cuban Assets Control Regu-
lations,7 which were enacted in 1963. Part III discusses the con-
stitutional grant of executive authority to regulate a citizen's
transactions with foreign countries, noting the traditional defer-
ence given the Executive in the realm of foreign affairs. Part IV
presents the decision of the court of appeals and the majority
and the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court. Part V ana-
lyzes the Court's decision, evaluating the conflicting interpreta-
tions of the scope of presidential power prescribed by the grand-
father clause of the TWEA. The Note concludes that despite
congressional attempts to restrict the presidential exercise of
emergency economic power under section 5(b) of the TWEA, the
enactment of the IEEPA did not limit the President's authority
to act with respect to those countries in which the President had
been exercising his section 5(b) authorities prior to July 1, 1977.
The grandfather clause of the TWEA excepted the Executive
regulation of travel-related economic transactions with Cuba
from the procedural requirements of the IEEPA, because the
President was exercising that authority by means of a general
license as of July 1, 1977. The grandfather clause of the TWEA
is very broad and if Congress wishes to remedy the exercise of
presidential authority under antiquated declarations of national
emergency, it must enact more specific statutes to carry out its
intent. If there is any ambiguity, courts must give the Executive
the traditional deference in the realm of foreign affairs.
II, History of the TWEA
A. Section 5(b) of the TWEA
The Trading With the Enemy Act was passed in 1917 in
response to the United States entry into World War 1.8 Origi-
nally, section 5(b) of the TWEA authorized the President to reg-
ulate economic transactions with foreign nations only during
times of war.' In 1933, however, the TWEA was amended to au-
7. 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 to .809
(1984)).
8. See Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (current version at
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982)).
9. For a brief history of the TWEA, see generally, Revision of Trading With the
[Vol. 5:693
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thorize the use of section 5(b) economic powers during peace-
time national emergencies.10 Since its enactment in 1917, section
5(b) has been criticized for being the "catch all" authority used
by Presidents when they lacked specific authority to justify their
conduct in foreign affairs. 1 From 1933 to 1977, section 5(b) au-
thorities were available to the President during times of war or
during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President. This broad grant conferred virtually unchecked dicta-
torial powers on the President without any statutory provision
for congressional review.12
Enemy Act, Markup Before the House Comm. on International Relations 95th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 5, 8-9 (1977) (prepared statement of Rep. Jonathan Bingham, Chairman of the
House Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade) [hereinafter cited in text
as House Markup].
10. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(1982)).
In 1933 President Roosevelt declared a national emergency under § 5(b) of
the TWEA, authorizing him to declare a bank holiday to prevent the hoarding of
gold. The President invoked this authority, even though § 5(b) was explicitly lim-
ited by its terms to wartime use. However, Congress ratified this usage retroac-
tively by amending § 5(b) on the first day of its 1933 session.
House Markup, supra note 9, at 8.
Presidential authority under the TWEA was delegated to the secretary of the Trea-
sury who exercises it through the Office of Foreign Assets Control. See 50 U.S.C. app. §
5(b) (1982).
11. House Markup, supra note 9, at 8. See also S . REP. No. 1170, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1974).
12. See House Markup, supra note 9, at 2, 5, 8-9. Representative Bingham noted
that the TWEA has been subject to abuse by Presidents, stretching the powers conferred
on them by the Constitution. Prior to 1977, there were four declarations of national
emergency under the TWEA: (1) President Roosevelt's 1933 bank holiday declaration,
Proclamation No. 2040, reprinted in 48 Stat. 1691 (1933); (2) President Truman's decla-
ration of national emergency in response to the Korean conflict and the trend of Com-
munist expansionism in the 1950's, Proclamation No. 2914, reprinted in Fed. Reg. 9029
(1950); (3) President Nixon's 1970 declaration concerning a Post Office strike, Proclama-
tion No. 3972, reprinted in 3 C.F.R. 473 (1966 - 1970 compilation); and (4) President
Nixon's 1970 declaration concerning the country's balance-of-payments crisis, Proclama-
tion No. 4074, reprinted in 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1971). Presently section 5(b) of the
TWEA provides the authority for trade embargoes against North Korea, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Cuba and the continued regulation of export controls to various East European
countries. See e.g., House Markup, supra note 9, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep.
Jonathon Bingham) (delineating the background of the TWEA and the reason for its
1977 amendment). The trade embargo against the Peoples Republic of China has been
lifted, see infra note 147. For a discussion concerning the need for legislation amending §
5(b) of the TWEA, see also H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1977) (available
on CIS microfiche: No. H 463-14) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT] (statements of
Prof. Stanley D. Metzger of Georgetown University Law Center; Prof. Andreas F.
3
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Prior to its amendment in 1977, section 5(b) of the TWEA
gave the President four types of power "[diuring the time of war
or during any other period of national emergency declared by
the President."' 3 First, he was given broad regulatory powers
over foreign property transactions, banking transfers, the import
and export of currency, and security transactions. Second, the
President had the authority to regulate property in which for-
eign countries or nationals had an interest. Third, the Executive
could vest any property or property interest of a foreign country
or of a foreign national. Finally, the President had the power to
administer, liquidate, freeze, sell or otherwise deal with vested
property for the benefit of the United States."
B. National Emergencies Act
In theory, once the President declared a state of national
emergency, the emergency officially continued until the Presi-
dent terminated it.'5 In practice, once the President declared a
period of national emergency, he was slow to lift it, even if the
circumstances that brought about the declaration ended. For in-
stance, President Truman made a declaration of national emer-
gency during the Korean War" and the Executive continued to
issue regulations under this declaration in the 1970's."7
Concern about the ongoing nature of states of national
emergency and the concomitant power bestowed on the Presi-
dent led Congress to enact the National Emergencies Act of
1976 (NEA). 18 The NEA provided that presidential power exer-
cised under existing declarations of national emergency would
terminate two years from September 14, 1976.11
The Act provided new procedures for the declaration, con-
Lowenfeld of New York University Law School; and Mr. Peter Weiss, Vice President for
the Center for Constitutional Rights).
13. Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(1982)).
14. Id. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
15. HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
16. House Markup, supra note 9, at 8-9.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
1601-1651 (1982)).
19. Id.
[Vol. 5:693
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duct and termination of future national emergencies.2 There
were, however, certain emergency power statutes exempted from
the provisions of the NEA due to their importance to the daily
functioning of the government. Under the NEA, Congress was to
study the exempted statutes to revise them to conform with the
NEA without disrupting the foreign policies currently in effect
under their authority.21 Section 5(b) of the Trading With the
Enemy Act of 1917 was one of the statutes excluded from the
coverage of the NEA because Congress was concerned about ter-
minating existing regulations authorized by section 5(b) of the
TWEA.2 2 The House Committee on International Relations and
its Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
had the responsibility of revising section 5(b) of the TWEA to
conform with the procedural requirements of the NEA. 2 This
Committee studied H.R. 7738,24 a bill to redefine the power of
the President to regulate international economic transactions
during times of war or national emergency.2 H.R. 7738,
amended section 5(b) of the TWEA and set forth a new proce-
dural framework for the Executive's use of peacetime economic
emergency powers. 6
C. H.R. 7738, Public Law Number 95-223
Title I of H.R. 7738,27 amended section 5(b) of the TWEA,
limiting the President's power to exercise section 5(b) authori-
ties solely to times of war. 8 In addition, title I grandfathered
those peacetime exercises of section 5(b) authorities which were
being exercised on July 1, 1977. Title II of H.R. 7738, the
IEEPA,2 '9 established a new set of authorities for the executive
to use during peacetime national emergencies. These authorities
20. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6-7.
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977).
23. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6-7.
24. H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 22,473-75 (1977).
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
26. Id. at 1-2.
27. H.R. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 22,473-75 (1977).
28. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625-26, reprinted in
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (1982).
29. Id. §§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (1977).
1985]
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are more narrow than those under section 5(b) and are subject
to various procedural limitations."0 The authorities granted to
the Executive in the IEEPA are basically the same as those of
section 5(b) of the TWEA,3  except that the IEEPA excludes:
(1) the power to take title to foreign property; (2) the power to
regulate purely domestic transactions; (3) the power to regulate
gold and bullion and; (4) the power to seize records.32 The proce-
dural requirements of the IEEPA impose important restrictions
on the President's emergency power. Under section 1701(b) of
the IEEPA, the President has the authority to invoke peacetime
emergency economic powers only if he declares a national emer-
gency because of an unusual and extraordinary threat stemming,
in whole or in part, from outside the United States. The threat
must jeopardize the national security, foreign policy or economy
of the United States.33 Before exercising the IEEPA authorities,
the President is required, "in every possible instance," to con-
sult with Congress. Moreover, once his authorities have been ex-
ercised, the President must report to Congress every six months
on the actions taken and any changes in the emergency
situation."
30. HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
31. The authorities that can be exercised under the IEEPA are provided in § 1702:
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the Presi-
dent may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments
involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or excercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any inter-
est; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the TWEA authorities, see supra note
14 and accompanying text.
32. HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 14-15.
33. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
34. Id. § 1703.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/7
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D. Grandfather Clause of Section 5(b) of the TWEA
Congress enacted the grandfather clause of section 5(b) of
the TWEA to mitigate the adverse effect that terminating the
existing exercises of section 5(b) authorities would have had. Ex-
isting economic embargoes against countries such as Cuba are an
important foreign policy tool. The embargoes are a source of lev-
erage for the United States, enabling the Executive to quickly
respond to foreign actions contrary to American interests. 6
Thus, when it terminated existing embargoes in the NEA, Con-
gress had two goals in mind. First, it did not want to totally
disrupt the President's policies toward the affected countries by
unilaterally ending the embargoes."' Second, the House Subcom-
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade concluded
that requiring the President to publicly announce a new declara-
tion of national emergency pursuant to the IEEPA, in order to
preserve those embargo powers previously being exercised under
the authority of section 5(b) of the TWEA, could have adverse
foreign policy ramifications.
In order to accomplish these goals, Congress enacted a
grandfather clause that enabled the President to continue to
control transactions with those countries that were subject to
35. See Joint Appendix at 178-83, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (No. 83-
436) (declaration of James H. Michel). The Michel declaration provides in part:
A central source of leverage the United States has over Cuba lies in the power
of the United States to prohibit persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from engaging
in various economic activities with Cuba or its nationals that would benefit Cuba
This program, as implemented by comprehensive regulations issued under the
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), has been maintained for twenty years.
During this period, this regulatory scheme has proven to be a flexible and essen-
tial instrument of United States foreign policy. It enables the Executive to re-
spond promptly to Cuban actions. In addition, through fine-tuning of the regula-
tions, the scheme has served to buttress U.S. diplomatic initiatives.
Id. at 178-79.
36. See Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977) (statement of Prof. Andreas
Lowenfeld) [hereinafter cited as Emergency Controls Hearings]; see also id. at 103, 113,
119 (statements of Assistant Treasury Secretary Bergsten).
37. Id. at i89-90 (remarks of Mr. Leonard E. Santos of the Treasury Department)
a new declaration of national emergency could create further tension among the affected
countries in a declining political relationship).
1985]
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the authorities of section 5(b) of the TWEA as of July 1, 1977.38
Thus, title I of H.R. 7738 grandfathered section 5(b) authorities
presently being exercised with respect to a country; further use
of those authorities did not have to comply with the newly en-
acted IEEPAs9 The Committee had decided that it would have
been too difficult and divisive to revise the existing uses of sec-
tion 5(b) authorities and improve procedures for future uses of
international emergency economic power in a single bill. Thus,
the final version of the law had a prospective nature. It con-
tained a grandfather clause that preserved the authorities under
section 5(b) of the TWEA that were being exercised on July 1,
1977, provided that the President extend those existing emer-
gency authorities for successive one year periods beyond Sep-
tember 14, 1978 - the date specified by the NEA for termina-
tion of all existing emergency authorities.4
Under the grandfather clause, section 5(b) authorities may
be extended if the President determines that such an extension
is in the national interest. Since 1978, Presidents Carter and
Reagan have determined that it is in the best interest of the
United States to continue to exercise the TWEA authorities
with respect to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia."1
38. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625, reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (1982). Title I of Public Law 95-223 provides in part:
Notwithstanding the amendment made by subsection (a), the authorities con-
ferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading With The Enemy Act,
which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of
a national emergency declared by the President before such date, may continue to
be exercised with respect to such country, except that, unless extended, the exer-
cise of such authorities shall terminate (subject to the savings provisions of the
second sentence of section 101(a) of the National Emergencies Act) at the end of
the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of the National Emergen-
cies Act. The President may extend the exercise of such authorities for one-year
periods upon a determination for each such extension that the exercise of such
authorities with respect to such country for another year is in the national interest
of the United States.
Id.
For a discussion of section 5(b) authorities of the TWEA, see supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text.
39. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625, reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (1982).
40. Id.
41. Memorandum of Sept. 8, 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memorandum of Sept. 12,
1979, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1655-56; Presidential Determination of Sept. 8, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg.
59,549; Memorandum of Sept. 10, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321; Memorandum of Sept. 8,
[Vol. 5:693
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/7
19851 REGAN v. WALD
The government exercises its TWEA authorities with respect to
Cuba through the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. 42
E. Cuban Assets Control Regulations
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) were en-
acted under the authority of the TWEA as part of an economic
embargo against Cuba.43 These regulations restrict Cuba's access
to hard currency with the express goal of undermining its ability
to finance the spread of communism to democratic allies of the
United States.44
1. Regulation 201(b)
In 1963, Regulation 201(b) was promulgated as part of the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations" and was implemented under
the authority of section 5(b) of the TWEA. Regulation 201(b)
prohibits those subject to United States jurisdiction from engag-
ing, directly or indirectly, in unauthorized economic transactions
with Cuba or Cuban nationals, including transactions incident to
travel to and within Cuba.' Regulation 201(b) has never been
withdrawn, abrogated or amended since its enactment in 1963.' 7
1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797; Memorandum of Sept. 7, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695; Memoran-
dum of Sept. 11, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927.
42. 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 to .809
(1984)).
43. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3030. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg.
6974 (1963) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R §§ 515.101 to .809 (1984)).
44. See Joint Appendix at 178-79, Wald (No. 83-436) (declaration of James H.
Michel, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs).
45. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1963) (current version reprinted in 31 C.F.R. §
515.201(b) (1984)). Section 515.201(b)(1) provided:
All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically author-
ized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality
designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or oth-
erwise, if such transactions involve property in which any foreign country desig-
nated under this part, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the
effective date of this section had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or
indirect:
(1) All dealings in, including, without limitation, transfers, withdrawals, or
exportations of, any property or evidences of indebtedness or evidences of owner-
ship of property by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...
46. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1984).
47. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1984). See Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3035.
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2. Regulation 560, 1977 General License
On March 9, 1977, President Carter removed most travel-
related economic restrictions on transactions with Cuba.48 Im-
plementing the President's proclamation, the Treasury Depart-
ment added regulation 560 to the CACRs.4 9 Regulation 560 was
a general license that authorized economic transactions ordina-
rily incident to travel to and within Cuba.50 It allowed persons
visiting Cuba to pay for their transportation and living expenses,
such as hotel bills and meals.51 Thus, in 1977, travel-related eco-
nomic transactions with Cuba were virtually unrestricted despite
the continued validity of Regulation 201(b) of the CACRs. Al-
though regulation 560 permitted essentially all travel-related ec-
onomic transactions with Cuba, some of the prohibitions of sec-
tion 201(b) remained. For instance, other restrictions on
48. President Carter's News Conference of March 9, 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. 305, 305
(1977).
49. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977) (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 515. 560 (1984)).
Regulation 560 was amended on May 18, 1977 to further relax existing restrictions on
travel-related economic transactions with Cuba. Cuban travel restrictions were eased in
response to the Helsinki Accords, which called for freedom of international movement
and communication. See Helsinki Accords, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
50. Regulation 560 provided:
(a) The following transactions are authorized:
(1) All transactions ordinarily incident to travel to and from Cuba.
(2) All transactions ordinarily incident to travel in Cuba, including payment
of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption
there.
(3) The purchase in Cuba, and importation as accompanied baggage, of mer-
chandise with a foreign market value not to exceed $100 per person, for personal
use only. Such merchandise may not be resold. The authorization in this subpara-
graph may only be used once in every six consecutive months.
(b) Persons who travel to Cuba for the purpose of gathering news, making
news or documentary films, engaging in professional research or for similar activi-
ties are authorized to acquire and import into the United States, as accompanied
baggage or otherwise, such photographs, films, books, magazines, newspapers, and
similar publications as are directly related to their professional activities, without
limitation as to value. Such merchandise may only be acquired and imported for
their own professional use or that of their employers at the time of the travel, and
may not be sold to other persons.
(c) Persons who traveled in Cuba after March 18, 1977, and who prior to that
date were not designated nationals of Cuba, are licensed as unblocked nationals.
This subparagragh does not authorize any transactions prohibited by any other
section of this part.
31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977).
51. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/7
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property transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals were unaf-
fected by the general license.2 In addition, the 1977 general li-
cense was subject to an important caveat. It was continuously
subject to regulation 515.805, which provided that any regula-
tion or license issued in connection with the CACRs may be
"amended, modified, or revoked" at any time.53
3. 1982 Amendment of Regulation 560
Declaring that Cuba continued to engage in activities hostile
to the interests of the United States, the Reagan Administration
amended regulation 560 in May of 1982 and revoked the general
license issued in 1977." Generally, the amendment prohibits
52. Travellers were not permitted to purchase merchandise in Cuba with a foreign
market value exceeding $100. In addition, any merchandise that was purchased had to be
for personal use and could not be resold. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(B) (1977). Also, all
scheduled air and sea travel was still prohibited, id. § 515.560(a)(5), and contracts be-
tween domestic credit card issuers and Cuban enterprises were also forbidden, id §
515.560(a)(7).
53. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.805
(1984)). In addition, all persons engaging in travel-related economic transactions with
Cuba were requied to make "a full and accurate record of each such transaction" and
retain this record for two years. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.601 (1977) (current version at 31
C.F.R. § 515.560 (1984)).
54. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1982) (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1984)).
Regulation 560 was promulgated in response to Cuba's efforts to destabilize democratic
governments in Central America. Joint Appendix at 171-72, Wald (No. 83-436) (declara-
tion of Thomas 0. Enders).
The 1982 amendment of regulation 560 provides in part:
(a)(1) General license. The transactions in paragraph (c) of this section are
authorized in connection with travel to Cuba by:
(i) Persons who are officials of the United States Government or of any for-
eign government, or of any intergovernmental organization of which the United
States is a member, and who are traveling on official business; (ii) persons who are
traveling for the purpose of gathering news, making news or documentary films,
engaging in professional research, or for similar activities; or (iii) persons, and per-
sons traveling with them who share a common dwelling as a family with them,
who are traveling to visit close relatives in Cuba.
(2). For purposes of this section, the term "close relative" means spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, great grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister,
nephew, niece, first cousin, or spouse, widow, or widower of any of the foregoing.
The term "close relative" also means mother-in-law, father-in-law, daughter-in-
law, son-in-law, sister-in-law, or brother-in-law.
(3) The general license contained in this section does not authorize transac-
tions in connection with tourist travel to Cuba, nor does it authorize transactions
in connection with business travel undertaken for any purposes other than those
set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
19851
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United States citizens from engaging in transactions "incident
to" ordinary business and tourist travel to Cuba.5 5 The Reagan
Administration amended the 1977 general license pursuant to
section 805"1 of the CACRs, which was in effect on July 1, 1977.
The government contended that since 1960, a major objective of
United States policy with Cuba has been to deny the Cuban gov-
ernment the financial means for conducting a program of vio-
lence against third world countries that is adverse to the security
interests of the United States. 7 The amendment of regulation
560 was specifically designed to thwart Cuba's plan to increase
its hard currency circulation by attracting tourists from the
United States.58 The administration contended that Cuba had
(b) Specific Licenses. Specific licenses authorizing the transactions in para-
graph (c) of this section will be issued in appropriate cases to persons desiring to
travel to Cuba for humanitarian reasons, or for purposes of public performances,
public exhibitions, or similar activities.
(c) The following transactions are authorized in connection with travel to and
within Cuba by persons licensed under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section:
(1) All transportation-related transactions ordinarily incident to travel to and
from Cuba.
(2) All transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, including pay-
ment of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal con-
sumption there.
(3) The purchase in Cuba, and importation as accompanied baggage, of mer-
chandise with a foreign market value not to exceed $100 per person. This authori-
zation may be used only once in every six consecutive months. Single copies of
publications do not count against the $100 limit set forth in this subparagraph.
For purposes of this section, the term "publications" includes books, newspapers,
magazines, films, phonograph records, tapes, photographs, microfilm, microfiche,
posters, and similar materials. All merchandise and publications obtained pursu-
ant to this subparagraph shall be for noncommercial use only and shall not be
resold.
31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1982).
55. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(3) (1984). However, specific licenses may be granted
for humanitarian, cultural, or athletic purposes and events. Id. § 515.560(a)(1).
56. Id. § 515.805.
57. See Joint Appendix at 172, Wald (No. 83-436) (declaration of Thomas 0.
Enders).
58. Id. at 174-75. Although tourism had not been an important source of revenue for
the Castro government in Cuba, tourism was a significant source of revenue prior to
1958. Data provided from hearings before the Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, House Interior Committee, March 28, 29, 30 and April 11, 12, 1961 provided
that, in 1958 Cuba earned $37 million from United States travellers alone, which equal-
led approximately two percent of its G.N.P. and almost four percent of its foreign ex-
change earnings. In 1958, Cuba had the highest tourist income of any country in the
Carribean. Tourism was Cuba's second largest industry and travellers from the United
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/7
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rapidly expanded its tourist industry during 1981 and early 1982
and intended to increase this important source of revenue. The
travel-related economic transactions were said to have the ca-
pacity to become the second most important source of converti-
ble currency for Cuba by providing the Cuban government with
a means to finance those actions contrary to the interests of the
United States.59
III. Authority of the President Under the Constitution
Determining the scope of Executive authority is not an easy
task. As Justice Jackson noted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,60 "[a] judge . ..may be surprised at the poverty of
really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present
themselves.""e
States constituted the largest component of this trade. The United States government
recognized this fact and realized that both its proximity to Cuba, and the affluence of its
population, made it a key market for Cuban tourism. Thus, in 1963, Regulation 201(b) of
the Cuban Asset Control Regulations prohibited tourist-related economic transactions.
See id.
United States travel statistics show that the 1982 amendment of the general license
reactivating § 201(b) of the CACRs, which prohibited U.S. citizens from engaging in
travel-related economic transactions with Cuba, did not in fact prevent travel to Cuba.
Travel to Cuba has increased since the May 1982 amendment; but tourism declined. The
last quarter of 1982, October through December, indicates a 45% decline in tourist travel
to Cuba, compared with the same quarter in 1981. Based on these statistics, the United
States contends that the 1982 amendment of regulation 560 appears to have denied Cuba
the increased revenues it would have otherwise earned had the 1982 amendment not
been enacted. See id. at 176-77.
59. Id. at 173-74. The United States was aware of Cuban plans to host a Conference
of International Travel Agents, which was to be held in Havana in June of 1982, at-
tracting 670 delegates from 195 tour agencies representing 28 countries, including the
United States. It was also alleged that Cuba intended to build a 22 hotel tourist complex
on Cayo Largo including gambling casinos and special attractions. Cayo Largo was to be
a "free port," isolated from the rest of Cuba and staffed by selected personnel. Id.
60. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
61. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. at 660. Article II, section two of the United States Constitution enumerates the
powers specifically granted to the President as chief executive of the federal government.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Much of the President's power however, both domestic and for-
eign, is implied in the general language of article II. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 118 (1926). The Constitution gives the President substantially greater authority in
the realm of foreign affairs than it does in domestic matters. United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Article II, section two authorizes the
President to appoint ambassadors, make treaties and command the armed forces of the
13
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In an attempt to define the obscure nature of executive au-
thority, Justice Jackson presented an often-cited framework for
analyzing the scope of executive authority. He asserted that the
President's powers were not fixed but fluctuated, depending on
their disjunction or conjunction with congressional powers.2
Justice Jackson contended that there were three categories of
Presidential authority. First, the president's authority is at its
maximum when he acts pursuant to the express or implied au-
thorization of Congress." Second, when the President acts with-
out a congressional grant or denial of authority, "there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress- may have concurrent au-
thority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 64 Finally, exec-
utive authority is "at its lowest ebb" when the President acts
against the express or implied will of Congress. 5 Thus, in order
to determine if the President exceeded the bounds of his power,
the Wald Court had to decide whether the President acted in
accordance with the 1977 amendments to the Trading with the
Enemy Act.6
Legislative Grant of Executive Authority
Concerned about the obscure scope of executive authority,
yet aware of the ramifications of rashly terminating previously
exercised presidential powers, Congress enacted the 1977
amendments to the TWEA and the IEEPA. By amending the
TWEA and enacting the IEEPA, Congress intended to limit
what was perceived as the Executive's uncurtailed authority to
exercise broad powers affecting future domestic and interna-
tional economic affairs.67 The procedures promulgated in the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 637.
65. Id. at 637-38. Justice Jackson concluded that the seizure of the steel mills fell
into this category and therefore was unconstitutional.
66. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29
(1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982).
67. See House REPORT, supra note 12, at 7 (statement of Peter Weiss, Vice Presi-
dent, Center for Constitutional Rights) ("The Trading with the Enemy Act is a prime
example of the unchecked proliferation of Presidential power for purposes totally unfore-
seen by the creators of that power."). See also Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note
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IEEPA provided Congress with a method for reviewing a Presi-
dent's exercise of section 5(b) authorities so that such an exer-
cise would not proceed ad infinitum. 8 Nevertheless, as seen in
Dames & Moore v. Regan,69 although the IEEPA affords Con-
gress more procedural control over the Executive's use of peace-
time international emergency economic power, the IEEPA did
not curtail the President's substantive exercises of such power.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,70 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that the legislative history and cases interpreting the
TWEA indicate that when the President is acting under a statu-
tory grant of authority, the scope of his power is to be construed
broadly.71 After the seizure of American citizens at the United
States embassy in Tehran, President Carter declared a national
emergency and used his emergency powers under the IEEPA to
block Iranian assets. 72 Responding to the hostage crisis, the
Treasury Department issued a regulation providing that
"[u]nless licensed or authorized pursuant to this part . ..any
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or
other judicial process is null and void with respect to any prop-
erty in which on or since the effective date there existed an in-
terest of Iran. '7 3 Subsequently, President Carter issued a gen-
eral license authorizing those with claims against Iranians to
apply for prejudgment attachment orders.74 Treasury regulations
specifically provided , that the license could be revoked or
amended.78 As a part of the agreement to release the American
hostages, President Carter revoked this general license and nul-
lified previously valid court-ordered attachments.7 6 The peti-
tioners alleged that the actions of the President and the Trea-
sury Department were beyond their statutory and constitutional
36, at 13-14, 16 (reports congressional concern over unchecked Presidential emergency
power).
68. See Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36 at 13-14.
69. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 672-74.
72. Id. at 662.
73. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1984); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at
663.
74. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 663.
75. Id. at 664.
76. Id. at 665-66.
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powers." The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that the
President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order
the transfer of Iranian assets under section 1702(a)(1)(B) of the
IEEPA, which empowered the President to "compel," "nullify,"
or "prohibit" any "transfer" with respect to, or transactions in-
volving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, in which any foreign country has an interest. 8
The Court stated that nothing in the legislative history of
either section 1702 of the IEEPA or section 5(b) of the TWEA
from which section 1702 was drawn, requires ignoring the plain
meaning of the words "transfer," "compel," or "nullify." To the
contrary, the Court recognized that the President had acted to
place the Iranian assets at his disposal so that he could use them
as a "bargaining chip" to negotiate an end to a declared national
emergency. 9 Moreover, because the Court stated that the
IEEPA specifically authorized the President's actions, it con-
cluded that those actions were "'supported by the strongest of
presumptions and widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and
the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might
attack'" them.80 This deference to presidential authority corre-
sponds to the scope of executive authority traditionally given
the President in the realm of foreign affairs due to the "very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations."81 The need for negotiation, plus the President's spe-
cial access to sources of confidential information, necessitated "a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved. '82
In Regan v. Wald, as in Dames & Moore v. Regan, the
Court concluded that Congress authorized the President's ac-
tions and supported those actions with the "widest latitude of
77. See id. at 667.
78. See id. at 669-74 (construing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1976)). For the text of §
1702(a)(1)(B), see supra note 31.
79. Id. at 673.
80. Id. at 674 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
81. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
82. See id.
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judicial interpretation." 83 The Court determined that the Presi-
dent was in fact exercising his authority under section 5(b) of
the TWEA on July 1, 1977, by regulating travel-related eco-
nomic transactions with Cuba through the 1977 general license.
IV. Regan v. Wald
A. Facts
American citizens who were prohibited from traveling to
Cuba by Treasury Department regulation 560 sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to prohibit enforcement of that regulation." The
petitioners contended that the President did not have the au-
thority to impose the 1982 restrictions on travel-related eco-
nomic transactions contained in regulation 560. They argued
that the prohibition had been enacted without complying with
the consultative procedures of the IEEPA.8 5 Furthermore, they
claimed that the grandfather clause of the TWEA did not ex-
empt regulation 560 from IEEPA procedures because the 1982
regulation went beyond the authorities being exercised on July
1, 1977. The petitioners also challenged regulation 560 on consti-
tutional grounds, asserting that it violated their right to travel
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
B. The Decisions
1. Lower Court Decisions
The United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts referred the petitioners' requests to a magistrate who
found that the grandfather clause gave the President the author-
ity to amend regulation 560.86 The magistrate reasoned that al-
though there were few restrictions on travel-related transactions
to Cuba after President Carter amended regulation 560 in 1977,
some authority was still being exercised under a general licens-
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. Wald v. Regan, No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. July 16, 1982), reprinted in Petitioner's
Brief for Writ of Cert. at 24a, Wald (No. 83-436).
85. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
86. Wald v. Regan, No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. July 16, 1982), reprinted in Petitioner's
Brief for Writ of Cert. at 24a, Wald (No. 83-436).
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ing scheme.8 7 Thus, the magistrate concluded that the President
could modify the general license to impose tighter controls on
economic transactions without following the procedural require-
ments of the IEEPA.8 The district court accepted the magis-
trate's conclusions and denied the request for a preliminary
injunction.89
The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district
court's order and remanded the case with instructions to issue a
preliminary injunction. A three-judge panel unanimously
agreed that there was no statutory authority for regulation 560
because the grandfather clause of the IEEPA had not preserved
the authority to promulgate new restrictions on travel-related
economic transactions with Cuba.91 The court advanced two
lines of reasoning in support of its decision. First, it found that
travel-related restrictions were not being exercised on July 1,
1977 within the meaning, intent, and purpose of the grandfather
clause.92 Second, the court concluded that, even if the statutory
language and history of the grandfather clause were ambiguous,
constitutional considerations and the intent of related contem-
porary statutes supported interpreting the grandfather clause in
favor of the plaintiffs."
The court of appeals presented three reasons for its decision
that the "authority" to regulate travel-related economic transac-
tions with Cuba was not "being exercised" on July 1, 1977. First,
"as a matter of common sense and common English," there was
a large enough difference between restricting commodity
purchases and restricting travel purchases so that they do not
encompass the same exercise of authority.9 " The First Circuit
87. For the text of the general license, see supra note 50.
88. See Wald v. Regan, No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. July 22, 1982), reprinted in Peti-
tioner's Brief for Writ of Cert. at 35a, Wald (No. 83-436).
89. Id.
90. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d at 801.
91. Id. The First Circuit did not reach plaintiff's constitutional argument because it
found that the challenged regulation lacked statutory authority. Id at 795.
92. Id. at 796-800.
93. Id. at 800-01. To reinforce their claim that the 1982 amendment to the general
license exceeded the presidential exercise of authority, the petitioners also alleged that
the 1982 amendment to the general license violated the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. §
211(a) (1982).
94. Id. at 796. From 1977 to 1982, regulation 560 only restricted commodity
purchases. See supra note 43. The Reagan Administration amended regulation 560 to
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contended that a restriction of commodity purchases has an ap-
preciably different direct effect than a restriction of travel-re-
lated expenses.9 5 The court also stated that the government's
administrative practice had treated travel-related restrictions
differently from other more typical TWEA rules and regula-
tions." Finally, the First Circuit noted that "unlike most com-
mercial regulations, travel restrictions raise special constitu-
tional issues, because they involve specifically protected rights of
citizens. '97 Thus, because the court considered an "exercise" of
authority to restrict travel as qualitatively different from the au-
thority to control the influx of Cuban goods, it held the author-
ity to restrict travel-related transactions was not
grandfathered.as
The First Circuit's second reason for concluding that the
power to enact regulation 560 had not been grandfathered was
that the legislative history of the grandfather clause clearly indi-
cated that it was to be narrowly construed. The grandfather
clause only allowed the Executive to continue those prohibitions
actually in effect on July 1, 1977. 9 The court pointed to commit-
tee hearings and to House and Senate reports to demonstrate
that each time legislators discussed the term "authorities" in the
grandfather clause, they referred to "existing uses" of TWEA
authority. Administrative spokesmen for the IEEPA also inter-
preted the grandfather clause narrowly, representing that only
existing exercises of section 5(b) authority would be pre-
served.100 The court of appeals took careful note that the princi-
include constraints on travel-related economic transactions as well as commodity
purchases. See supra note 54.
95. Id. at 796-97. Restricting commodity purchases has the effect of keeping money
and valuable commodities out of the hands of a hostile country. However, prohibiting
travel-related transactions has a small economic consequence for the foreign country but
in effect eliminates tourist and business travel to that country. Id.
96. Id. at 797. For many years the Departments of State and Justice did not think
they had the power to control travel to and from the United States, but they regularly
restricted commodity purchases. Id.
97. Id. at 797.
98. See id. at 796-97.
99. Id. at 798 (construing Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat.
1625, 1625).
100. Id. The court stated that Leonard E. Santos of the Treasury Department testi-
fied that the TWEA grandfathered "existing uses." Testimony from both Treasury and
State Department spokesmen listed the uses of 5(b) they wanted grandfathered. Travel
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pal legislative spokesman for the IEEPA rejected draft language
that would have preserved presently unused authorities of the
President under section 5(b) of the TWEA.10' Therefore, the
court of appeals concluded that Congress clearly intended the
grandfather clause to save only those specific prohibitions in ef-
fect on July 1, 1977.102
Finally, the court of appeals reasoned that Congress enacted
the grandfather clause to protect "existing trade embargoes
[and] to mitigate the adverse effect that automatic repeal would
have had on the President's negotiating position with respect to
other countries."103 To require the President to terminate an
embargo without obtaining anything in return, or to force the
President to declare a new national emergency to continue an
existing embargo, might disrupt delicate foreign policy. The
grandfather clause was enacted to avoid this type of disloca-
tion.04 However, the imposition of travel-related restrictions did
not pose the kind of problem that the grandfather clause was
designed to avoid, namely the disruption of foreign policy.10 5
The First Circuit noted that the 1982 regulation had in fact,
been accompanied by a public statement that declared the puni-
tive purpose of regulation 560.106
The court of appeals also presented an alternate two-prong
basis for its conclusion. Even if the language or the intent of the
grandfather clause was ambiguous, it must be construed nar-
rowly because the challenged statute implicated the constitu-
tionally protected right to travel. 107 The court noted that, al-
to Cuba was not one which was enumerated. Id. (citing Emergency Controls Hearings,
supra note 36, at 3036 n.20).
101. Id. at 799 (construing Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36, at 167).
102. Id. at 798.
103. See Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d at 798. To have required the President to publicly
announce a new declaration of emergency to continue existing embargoes could have
required him to take an action with undesirable ramifications.
104. Id.
105. Id. Regulation 560 did not involve the termination of an embargo, nor did it
require the President to take an il-advised action to retain his authority to continue the
embargo. Regulation 560 involved imposing travel-related economic restrictions on travel
to Cuba. Id.
106. See id. The Administration announced that the purpose of regulation 560 was
to deprive Cuba of hard currency during a time when it was encouraging armed violence
against U.S. allies. Id. at 800 (citing N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at Al, col. 4).
107. Id.
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though deference is usually granted to the Executive in matters
of foreign policy, the Supreme Court has explicitly instructed
courts to" 'construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail
or dilute' the right to travel."108 The court's narrow interpreta-
tion of the grandfather clause did not render the President pow-
erless to act with respect to Cuba. °9 The court of appeals recog-
nized that Congress, through the IEEPA, had "taken measures
inconsistent with the President's claim to power" and therefore,
unless the President followed the procedural requirements of the
IEEPA when he amended the 1977 general license, his power
was at its lowest ebb. 10 Thus, the First Circuit applied this prin-
ciple of narrow interpretation and required the President to
comply with the IEEPA in order to preserve the "equilibrium"
established when the IEEPA was enacted.'1 '
The second prong of the court's alternative basis for invali-
dating regulation 560 involved an analysis of contemporaneous
statutes. The First Circuit noted that during the period when
the IEEPA was enacted, Congress passed other statutes to re-
strict presidential power." 2 In particular, the First Circuit ex-
amined an amendment to the Passport Act that prohibited "the
executive branch from imposing peacetime passport travel re-
strictions without the authorization of Congress except for
health and safety considerations."" 3 The First Circuit concluded
that a broad reading of the grandfather clause as applied to a
travel-related restriction would negate the effect of this amend-
ment and be in conflict with the general purpose of related
statutes." '
108. Id. (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958)).
109. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d at 800.
110. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). For a discussion of Justice Jackson's framework analyz-
ing the scope of executive authority, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
111. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d at 800.
112. Id. at 800-01. The court refers to: War Powers Resolutions, Pub. L. No. 93-148,
87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)); National Emergencies
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1651 (1982)); Passport Act, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963, 971 (1978) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982)).
113. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d at 801.
114. See id.
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2. Supreme Court Opinions
a. The Majority
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the 1982 regula-
tion was consistent with both federal law and the Constitution
and was "justified by the weighty concerns of foreign policy."'115
The Court therefore reversed the First Circuit stating that a
"constricted reading of the grandfather clause does violence to
the words chosen by Congress."' 116 The majority said the clause
"refers to 'authorities' being exercised on July 1, 1977, not to
'prohibitions' actually in place on that date."'"17 Thus, the grand-
father clause should be construed broadly to preserve all author-
ities being exercised on that date.1 8
The Court supported this conclusion by stating that travel-
related restrictions are part of the general authority of the Exec-
utive to regulate property transactions." 9 The President was ex-
ercising his broad authority under section 5(b) of the TWEA to
regulate property transactions through section 201(b) of the
CACRs, which was in effect on July 1, 1977.120 Section 201(b)
expressly prohibited all transactions involving property in which
Cuba or its nationals had an interest unless specifically author-
115. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Stevens and
O'Connor joined in the opinion of the Court.
116. Id. at 3035. Because the First Circuit struck down the regulation on statutory
grounds it had no need to decide whether the regulation also violated the constitutional
right to travel that previous Supreme Court decisions have found implicit in the fifth
amendment's due process clause. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The
Court held that the regulation presented no constitutional difficulty. Traditional defer-
ence to the President's authority in foreign policy provided sufficient rationale under the
due process clause for restricting travel. In this instance, there was no charge that travel
was being restricted based on affiliation or political belief. It is a prohibition which is
applied fairly and is justified by the executive's decision to restrict the flow of hard cur-
rency to Cuba in order to inhibit that country's support of armed violence in the West-
ern Hemisphere. Id. at 3037-39.
117. Id. at 3035.
118. See id. at 3035-38.
119. Id. at 3033-34. The Court noted that § 5(b) of the TWEA contains sweeping
,language authorizing the President to regulate any transactions involving property in
which a foreign country or one of its nationals has an interest. Id. at n.16. Furthermore,
the fact that the language of § 203(a) of the IEEPA, describing procedures following
declaration of a national emergency, merely tracks the language of § 5(b) of the TWEA
shows that Congress did not distinguish between travel-related transactions and other
transactions in property. Id. at n.17.
120. See id. at 3034-35.
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ized by a license. 21 The Court noted that the original regulation
560, a general license that was an exemption from the CACRs,
was promulgated in March 1977 and in effect until 1982. The
Court reasoned that the existence of this license, which permit-
ted travel-related transactions, was an "exercise" of authority,
albeit by nonrestrictive regulation. 22 Accordingly, because sec-
tion 5(b) power was being exercised on July 1, 1977, by means of
a license, it followed that the power to amend the license was
one of the "authorities" grandfathered in the amendments to
the TWEA.125
The Court also examined the legislative history and the pur-
pose of the grandfather clause to support its statutory interpre-
tation. First, the Court looked to the express language, com-
menting that had Congress wished to freeze existing restrictions,
it could have done so by using that word rather than the generic
term authorities.124 Acknowledging that there was some support
for a narrow interpretation of the grandfather clause,120 the
Court, nonetheless concluded that, even if this were the only in-
dication of legislative intent, it would not be sufficient to over-
come the "clear, generic meaning of the word authorities."12"
The Court contended that oral testimony concerning draft
language of the bill should not be used to alter the meaning of
the language Congress officially adopted.1 27 Instead, the Court
121. 31 C.F.R. § 515.501(b) (1984).
122. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3032-33.
123. See id. at 3033-34.
124. Id. at 3035.
125. Id. at 3035-36. The Court agreed with the court of appeals that the following
excerpt from Bergsten's Assistant Secretary of the Treasury testimony before Rep. Cava-
naugh and the House Committee on International Relations, supported a narrow reading
of the grandfather clause:
MR. CAVANAUGH.... First of all, Mr. Bergsten, would it be your under-
standing that [the grandfather clause] would strictly limit and restrict the
grandfathering of powers currently being exercised under 5(b) [of TWEA] to those
specific uses of the authorities granted in 5(b) being employed as of June 1, 1977.
MR. BERGSTEN .... Yes, sir.
MR. CAVANAUGH. And it would preclude the expansion by the President of
the authorities that might be included in 5(b) but are not being employed as of
June 1, 1977.
MR. BERGSTEN. That is right.
Id. (quoting House Markup, supra note 6, at 21-22).
126. Id. at 3036.
127. Id.
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concluded that a full examination of the legislative history sup-
ported a broad reading of the grandfather clause.12 8 "The crucial
point is that the discussion, even in the excerpts [of oral testi-
mony], is consistently carried on in terms of existing 'powers'
and 'authorities,' not in terms of existing 'restrictions' or
'prohibitions.' ,129
Turning to an examination of the purpose of the grandfa-
ther clause, the Court rejected the view that it was designed
solely to preserve "bargaining chips" with affected countries.130
The Court contended that the grandfather clause was intended
to keep the IEEPA from becoming too controversial. Contro-
versy would have delayed enactment of the IEEPA. Thus, in the
majority's view, Congress decided to focus on improving proce-
dures for future uses of emergency powers rather than revising
current uses.1 3' The Court noted that the chairman of the re-
sponsible House Subcommittee, Congressman Bingham, ex-
pressly assured Congress that the existing embargo against Cuba
would not be affected by the IEEPA.3 2 The Court concluded
that limiting the President's power to modify an existing license,
in response to increased tensions with Cuba, would have created
the type of controversy that the grandfather clause was meant to
avoid. 133
b. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent,13' Justice Blackmun presented an
entirely different interpretation of the history and purpose of
the grandfather clause, concluding that it does not provide stat-
128. Id. at 3036-37. The Court stated that the legislative history of the grandfather
clause contains explicit mention that travel-related restrictions are among the authorites
being exercised. Id. at 3037 n.22.
129. Id. at 3036-37.
130. Id. at 3037.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. Jus-
tice Powell filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which he concluded that Congress
clearly did not intend the grandfather clause to advance the expansion of presidential
power that the 1982 amendment of regulation 560 invoked. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3049
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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utory authority for the 1982 amendment of regulation 560.185
Justice Blackmun began his analysis with a review of the general
purpose of Public Law 95-223.131 He concluded that Congress in-
tended this statute to restrain an unwarranted expansion of ex-
ecutive power that had been unwittingly authorized by the
Trading With the Enemy Act.'
In the context of the overall purpose of Public Law 95-223,
the dissent found clear legislative intent that the grandfather
clause should be construed narrowly.' 8 According to the dissent,
the grandfather clause was enacted to achieve two goals: (1) to
protect the President's bargaining position with countries sub-
ject to existing embargoes; and (2) to avoid the need to declare a
new state of emergency in order to continue existing embar-
goes.'"9 According to the dissent, legislators who supported the
amendment indicated that the grandfather clause was to be
drafted and construed narrowly to achieve those purposes,
rather than to justify the exercise of power to enact new
restrictions.1 40
Justice Blackmun rejected the view that use of the term
"authorities" indicated intent for a broad interpretation of the
grandfather clause. He argued that such a position was discred-
ited by legislative history that documented that Congress in-
tended to grandfather "restrictions," "controls," "specific uses,"
135 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3040 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625.
137. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3042 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun suggests
that the TWEA intended to give a president broad powers during times of emergency.
However, the TWEA did not include any provisions for terminating states of emergency
once they had been declared. Thus, presidents inappropriately used emergency powers as
instruments of foreign policy long after the imminent threat of any state of emergency
had subsided. The national emergency most often invoked was Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 2914, reprinted in 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950). It was President Truman's warning
about the threat of communism and was used to jusify any acts related to combatting
the threat of communism.
138. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3043-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 3042-43.
140. Id. at 3042-45. The dissent argued that a narrow interpretation was advocated
by a number of legislators. Rep. Bingham opposed adopting statutory language that
would preserve all the powers necessary to deal with a certain situation. Rather, he
stated that the grandfather clause was to apply only to powers that had already been
exercised. Id. at 3043-44 (quoting Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36, at 167).
Explanations to the full House Committee emphasized that the grandfather clause only
preserved § 5(b) authorities being exercised on July 1, 1977. Id. at 3044-45.
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"prohibitions," "existing uses," and "authorities.' 1 41 The dissent
suggested that the word "authorities" was used rather than
"prohibitions" for the simple reason that section 5(b) conferred
broad authorities, some of which would not have fit within the
natural meaning of "prohibitions" if used in place of
"authorities.' 14 2
Justice Blackmun agreed that the grandfather clause was
designed to avoid controversy but contended that the majority
misunderstood which aspects of the IEEPA were potentially di-
visive. 14 He said that the grandfather clause was to preclude: (1)
an examination of current controls; (2) the need to declare new
emergencies when none actually existed; and, (3) ending restric-
tions without receiving something in return from the affected
countries.' 44 The dissent argued that the restriction of travel-re-
lated transactions did not come within any of the concerns to
which the grandfather clause was addressed. 14
Finally, the dissent insisted that an examination of our
trade relations with China proved that it was incongruous to
conclude that Congress meant the grandfather clause to preserve
executive authority to modify existing embargoes.141 In 1950,
trade with China had been prohibited through an exercise of
section 5(b) authorities."17 An equally broad general license is-
sued in 1971 abrogated this restriction. The general license au-
thorized transactions with China after May 8, 1971, while con-
tinuing a freeze of Chinese assets that were in American hands
before that date. 14 Despite the existence of this general license,
a House report describing section 5(b) authorities in use at the
time of the IEEPA concluded that the general license "had the
141. Id. at 3045.
142. Id. at 3045-46. Justice Blackmun noted that § 5(b) authorized the President to
conduct investigations as well as to freeze assets, neither of which could have been com-
prehended by the term "prohibition."
143. Id. at 3046.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 3046-47. The dissent found the Court's conclusion that Congress
chose to give the President greater flexibility to respond to tensions with Cuba, than
with another country to be remarkable since Congress clearly expressed its view that the
situation in Cuba did not represent an emergency situation. Id. at 3047.
146. Id. at 3048.
147. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201(b) (1950), amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 7224 (1980) (current
version at 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1984)).
148. 31 C.F.R. § 500.546 (1971), repealed by 45 Fed. Reg. 7224 (1980).
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effect of lifting the U.S. trade embargo of China." " 9 The dissent
argued that this indicated that Congress did not view a general
license lifting trade restrictions to have been an exercise of sec-
tion 5(b) authority. 5 0 Justice Blackmun stated that logic re-
quired a similar conclusion concerning the general license that
permitted travel-related transactions with Cuba.1 5
V. Analysis
The President was regulating travel-related economic trans-
actions to Cuba by a general license on July 1, 1977 pursuant to
section 5(b) of the TWEA. Therefore, his authority to restrict
those transactions by amending the general license to prohibit
travel-related economic transactions with Cuba in 1982 without
consulting with Congress, was preserved by the grandfather
clause. 15 1
This statutory authority exists because the term "authori-
ties", as used in the grandfather clause, must be construed to
support a broad exercise of executive authority. Dispute about
the scope of this term in the grandfather clause is, of course, the
nexus of conflict between the majority and dissent in Regan v.
Wald.15' The dissent does identify language in the congressional
hearings that leads to the conclusion that there is ambiguity in
the legislative history of the statute.' 5 There is, however, also
persuasive evidence that Congress intended a broad reading of
the grandfather clause. 55 The very existence of ambiguity about
presidential power in the area of foreign affairs compels the ex-
pansive construction adopted by the majority.
149. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3048 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting HousE REPoRT,
supra note 12, at 6).
150. Id.
151. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3048-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3034 (1984).
153. Id. at 3026.
154. Id. at 3044-45 (Blackmun. J., dissenting). For the Cavanaugh-Bingham ex-
change, see supra note 125.
155. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3034.
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A. The Meaning of "authorities" as used in the Grandfather
Clause
1. Plain Meaning
Because the grandfather clause refers to the authorities con-
ferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the TWEA, 15' one
must look to section 5(b) of the TWEA itself, to determine the
meaning of "authorities" as used in the grandfather clause. Sec-
tion 5(b) of the TWEA clearly defines the power it confers on
the President acting under its authorities. Included is the au-
thority to regulate through any agency designated, by means of
licenses or otherwise, any transaction involving property in
which any foreign country or national thereof has any interest.157
Thus, for purposes of the grandfather clause, the President's au-
thority to regulate travel-related transactions through a general
license is part of the President's broad general authority to regu-
late property transactions.
To use the court of appeals' own language, "as a matter of
common sense and common English,"1 58 restrictions on com-
modity purchases and travel-related purchases are the exercise
of the same authority, the authority to regulate property trans-
actions pursuant to section 5(b) of the TWEA.5" The court of
appeals erred in asserting that the restriction on commodity
purchases has a different effect than travel-related economic re-
strictions. 60 Both restrictions have the effect of interrupting the
flow of American currency to Cuba. State department officials
issued statements demonstrating that tourism had the potential
for substantially increasing the flow of hard currency to Cuba."'
The 1982 amendment of the general license cannot be
viewed as a per se restriction of the right to travel. Rather, it
regulated property transactions incident to travel, which had a
limited effect on the right to travel. It is true that tourist travel
from the United States to Cuba declined after the 1982 amend-
156. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
157. See id.
158. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 796 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
159. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the court of appeals' opinion, see supra notes 94-97 and
accompanying text.
161. Joint Appendix at 174-77, Wald (No. 83-436) (declaration of Thomas 0. En-
ders). See supra note 58.
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ment to the general license; however, all forms of travel to Cuba
by United States citizen$, when taken together, actually in-
creased after the amendment.162 The 1982 regulation still per-
mits many forms of travel to Cuba such as travel to visit family
members, humanitarian visits, and travel for the purpose of
news gathering.'6 3
The dissent argued strenuously that the term "authorities"
as it was used in the grandfather clause meant restrictions, ex-
isting uses and prohibitions in effect against Cuba in 1977.'" It
justified this interpretation by referring to statements of con-
gressmen during debates on Public Law 95-223.166 These pre-en-
actment colloquies are certainly less persuasive than the plain
meaning of "authorities" that the dissent ignored in its treat-
ment of the grandfather clause.166 It is ironic that the dissent's
explanation of why Congress chose the term "authorities" re-
futes its own premise that the grandfather clause was meant to
be interpreted narrowly. The dissent asserts that "authorities"
was used because a broad term was necessary to encompass all
section 5(b) powers of the TWEA, including the general power
to regulate and control any property transaction with which a
foreign country or national thereof has any interest.6 ' This ne-
gates the contention that Congress intended the grandfather
clause to be narrowly construed to save only those specific
prohibitions in effect as of July 1. Because section 5(b) of the
TWEA provided the authority to regulate property transactions
by way of licenses that allow transactions incident to travel, it is
inapposite to assert that a grandfather clause preserving those
"authorities" would only preserve "authorities" regulating prop-
erty transactions by way of prohibition.6 8 As the majority
pointed out, had Congress wished to draft a narrow grandfather
clause it could easily have used the terms "prohibitions or
162. Joint Appendix at 176-77, Wald (No. 83-436) (declaration of Thomas 0. En-
ders). See supra note 58.
163. C.F.R. § 515.560 (1984). For the text of regulation 560, see supra note 54.
164. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3045-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Act of Dec 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625.
166. Id. The dissent ignored the fact that § 5(b) of the TWEA defines "authorities"
in the text of the statute itself. See Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3045-46 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
167. Id. at 3045-46.
168. Id. at 3045-46.
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restrictions", ee
2. The Legislative History of the Grandfather Clause
The majority and dissent both agreed that the legislative
history contains statements suggesting that Congress wished to
grandfather "restrictions", "controls", "specific uses", "prohibi-
tions", "existing uses" and "authorities. ' 170 However, an exami-
nation of the congressional hearings does not support the inter-
pretation that the grandfather clause was intended only to
preserve restrictions existing as of July 1, 1977.
There is some legislative history that supports a narrow in-
terpretation of the grandfather clause; however, that alone is not
enough to overcome the plain meaning of the word "authorities"
in the statute itself. 7 1 A congressional subcommittee did delete
a subsection of a draft of the grandfather clause that would have
preserved section 5(b) authorities of the TWEA not being exer-
cised on July 1, 1977. Congressman Bingham, chief architect of
the 1977 amendment to the TWEA, did state that if, as of July
1, 1977, the President was not using some authority under sec-
tion 5(b), the right to use that power should not be preserved by
the grandfather clause.1 72 Nevertheless the Congressman's con-
cern does not necessarily mean that Congress intended a narrow
interpretation of the clause, preserving only specific restrictions
in effect on July 1, 1977.173 The subcommittee's action is at best
169. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
170. See Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3035-36; id. at 3045-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. Accord Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3036.
172. Id. Rep. Bingham stated: "[I]f the President has not up to now used some au-
thority that he has under section 5(b) in connection with those cases where 5(b) has been
applied, I don't know why it should be necessary to give him authority to expand what
has already been done." Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36, at 167.
173. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3036-37. As Justice Blackmun noted, the early version of
the grandfather clause contained two subparts that read:
(1) Any authority conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading
With the Enemy Act, which is being exercised with respect to a set of circum-
stances on the date of enactment of the Act as a result of a national emergency
declared by the President before such date of enactment, may continue to be exer-
cised with respect to each set of circumstances; and
(2) Any other authority conferred upon the President by that section may be
exercised to deal with the same set of circumstances.
Id. at 3043 (quoting Working Draft of H.R. 7738, June 8, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §
101(b)) (emphasis Justice Blackmun).
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ambiguous. As the majority noted, the subsection may have been
deleted as "surplusage."'' Language preserving unused TWEA
authorities was unnecessary. As of July 1, 1977, the President
was in fact exercising all of the authorities provided by section
5(b) of the TWEA."7
Congressman Bingham defined the "authorities" of section
5(b) of the TWEA that would come within the purview of the
grandfather clause. He described them as the authority to inves-
tigate, regulate or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, the
import or export of currency and foreign property under United
States jurisdiction. 7 ' Congressman Bingham also stated that
these authorities were being used to implement trade embargoes,
including complete embargoes like the one with respect to
Cuba.' " The 1982 amendment of regulation 560 represents an
exercise of precisely the type of authority described by the con-
gressman. By prohibiting United States citizens from engaging
in travel-related economic transactions with Cuba, the President
was prohibiting the export of United States currency to Cuba in
support of the purpose of the trade embargo against that coun-
try. The prohibition in amended regulation 560 is simply a mod-
ification of the manner in which the President was regulating
property transactions with Cuba on July 1, 1977. It clearly
comes within the scope of a reasonable interpretation of the
statute in light of its legislative history. Absent definitive, unam-
biguous legislative history to the contrary, courts must defer to
the plain meaning of the statute itself. 7 8
174. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3036 n.20.
175. See Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36, at 188 (remarks of Leonard
E. Santos, Attorney Advisior, Treasury Department). Mr. Santos testified that the lan-
guage in a subcommittee's working draft, which would have expressly grandfathered
presently unused authorities of the President under section 5(b) of TWEA, as long as
they related to an already declared national emergency, was unnecessary. Mr. Santos
stated: "We have reviewed the powers conferred under this draft. Frankly we believe
that all the powers conferred are exercised and that there are no additional powers that
could be exercised that are not already exercised." Id.
176. See House Markup, supra note 9, at 8 (prepared statement of Rep. Bingham).
177. Id.
178. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1981).
1985]
31
PACE LAW REVIEW
3. Policy Considerations Underlying Wald's Statutory
Interpretation
Dames & Moore v. Regan' 9 is sound precedent for two of
the most important conclusions of the majority in Regan v.
Wald. First, when there is conflicting legislative history about
the meaning of a statute, the Court must rely on its plain mean-
ing.180 Second, a broad interpretation of the language of the
grandfather clause is mandated because the IEEPA and the
TWEA give the President flexibility to change the scope and
form of regulations to respond to changes in foreign policy and
national security.18 '
The Court, in Wald and Dames & Moore, faced remarkably
similar tasks of construing statutory language. The Wald Court
was confronted with defining the scope of the term "authorities"
as it was used in the grandfather clause of the amendment to
the TWEA. Analogously, the petitioners in Dames & Moore
challenged the extent of executive authority conferred by the
TEEPA. They asserted that language that gave the power to nul-
lify transactions involving any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest must be construed
very narrowly.18 1 Petitioners argued that the language of the
IEEPA did not permit the President to dispose of frozen assets
or to invalidate a judicial remedy such as attachment. '83 But the
Dames & Moore Court did not ignore the plain meaning of the
word "nullify" in section 1702(a)(1)(B) of the IEEPA. Even
though the IEEPA did not authorize the President to take title
to foreign owned assets, Dames & Moore held that the power to
nullify allowed the President to permanently dispose of those
assets by nullifying the court-ordered attachments. ' 8 The Court
stated that the plain language of the statute contradicted an as-
sertion that the only power granted by section 1702 of the
179. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
180. See id. at 671-73. The Dames & Moore Court refused to ignore the plain lan-
guage of § 5(b) of the TWEA and § 1702(a)(1)(B) of the IEEPA, because the legislative
history of these acts are contrary to the plain language of the statutes.
181. Id. at 672.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 672 n.5.
184. Id. at 675.
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IEEPA was the power to temporarily freeze assets. 185 Although
section 1702 of the IEEPA did not expressly authorize the Presi-
dent to dissolve attachments of foreign owned assets per se, it
specifically authorized the President to "nullify" property trans-
actions subject to United States jurisdiction involving foreign
countries. This authority over property transactions is broad
enough to allow Dames & Moore to encompass court-ordered at-
tachments of Iranian property.
Similarly, in Regan v. Wald it was not necessary for the
grandfather clause of section 5(b) of the TWEA to expressly
preserve the power to control travel-related economic transac-
tions with Cuba.. The broad authority to regulate property
transactions in which Cuba or Cuban nationals had an interest
was specifically grandfathered, if that power was being exercised
on July 1, 1977.
Dames & Moore also interpreted the legislative history of
the IEEPA. Its analysis has genuine precedential value for Re-
gan v. Wald because the IEEPA was part of the same bill that
included the grandfather clause to the TWEA. Furthermore, the
analysis in Dames & Moore is particularly relevant because the
Court defined the meaning of section 1702 of the IEEPA, which
had been drawn directly from section 5(b) of the TWEA.86
The Court, in Dames & Moore noted that the language of
the IEEPA is "sweeping and unqualified. ' 18 7 The Court con-
cluded that "the legislative history and cases interpreting the
TWEA fully sustained the broad authority of the Executive
when acting under this congressional grant of power."' 8 The
Court acknowledged that Congress had enacted this legislation
to curtail the President's power in peacetime. 89 Nonetheless,
185. The TWEA gave the President the power to: (1) temporarily freeze or block
the transfer of foreign owned assets; and (2) seize and vest title to foreign owned assets.
The Dames & Moore petitioners asserted that it was the vesting provision of the TWEA
that authorized the President to permanently dispose of assets. Thus, because Congress
excluded the vesting provision from the IEEPA, they argued that Congress did not wish
the President to have the authority to dispose of foreign-owned assets under the IEEPA.
Id. at 672 n.5.
186. See id. at 671-72 (construing 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982)).
187. See id. at 671 (quoting Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power
Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1981)).
188. Id. at 672.
189. Id. at 672-73.
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this does not require that statutory language be given a narrow
literal construction that would rob the Executive of the flexibil-
ity in foreign affairs that Congress meant to preserve.
Thus, Dames & Moore v. Regan supports the proposition
that courts must not ignore the plain language of a statutory
provision such as the grandfather clause of the TWEA.190 Ab-
sent substantial proof of a contrary legislative intent, plain
meaning prevails. Dames v. Moore suggests that this mandate is
all the more compelling when the Executive acts pursuant to a
congressional grant of power under the IEEPA or TWEA. 19'
This affords the Executive broad authority to exercise his inter-
national emergency economic powers.
The traditional deference given to the President in the field
of foreign affairs is a final and particularly cogent reason that
supports the result in Regan v. Wald.'92 When there is ambigu-
ity in the legislative history of a statute pertaining to the Presi-
dent's authority in foreign affairs, it must be construed to sup-
port a grant of authority.1 93 Although this is a recognized maxim
of statutory construction, it is particularly applicable when con-
struing the Trading with the Enemies Act. The TWEA has been
consistently construed by the courts as a means of granting the
Executive great flexibility in the realm of foreign affairs. 9 4 Any
conclusion that Congress intended a different result when enact-
ing a provision to preserve Presidential authority requires clear
unequivocal proof - not evidence of ambiguity.
190. Even though Dames & Moore cautioned that it did not attempt to lay down
any guidelines covering situations not involved in the case, it did not affect its preceden-
tial value for interpreting principles of law and statutes such as the IEEPA and § 5(b) of
the TWEA. Although the particular decision at hand may not be indicative of future
solutions to similar problems, the reasoning for its decision has value.
191. See generally id. at 671-72. Because the petitioner did not find substantial,
unambiguous proof in the legislative history of § 5(b) of the TWEA and § 1702 of the
IEEPA that contradicted the plain meaning of the statute, authorizing the Executive to
"nullify" the attachments, the Court upheld the plain meaning of the statute. Id. at 672.
192. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
193. See id. at 671-72.
194. Id. at 672.
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B. Travel-Related Economic Transactions with Cuba Were
Being Regulated on July 1, 1977
Although Congress intended that the grandfather clause
preserve the full range of section 5(b) authorities, it is equally
clear that the President's authority to exercise those powers dur-
ing peacetime under the TWEA was confined to the authorities
being exercised on July 1, 1977.9' A careful examination of the
purpose of the grandfather clause and of the nature of regula-
tion 560 demonstrates that the power to control travel-related
transactions was being exercised on the appropriate date.
1. The Purpose of the Grandfather Clause
The purpose of the grandfather clause can be fulfilled only
if it is read to preserve all section 5(b) authorities being exer-
cised on July 1, 1977, along with all of the specific methods Pres-
idents have used to implement each of those generic powers. Ec-
onomic embargoes against foreign countries have important
foreign policy consequences. Thus, Congress, when it amended
the TWEA, decided that it would have been too difficult and too
divisive to revise section 5(b) authorities already being exer-
cised. '9 It specifically foreswore any intention of affecting the
embargoes by confining the bill's purpose to improving future
uses of section 5(b) authorities.1 97 This purpose is reflected in
the Wald decision. The Supreme Court noted that the prime
reason for preserving the authority to continue existing embar-
goes, while restricting the President's use of peacetime interna-
tional emergency economic powers, was to avoid controversy
that would endanger the bill."8' If Congress did not intend the
grandfather clause to authorize the President to modify the
manner in which he was exercising one of the broad section 5(b)
authorities, it would have "sparked just the sort of controversy
the grandfather clause was designed to avoid." '199
195. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
196. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 9-10.
197. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
198. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3037.
199. Id. It is clear from the House Report that Congress tried to take a noncontro-
versial approach. The Report states:
Certain current uses of the authorities affected by H.R. 7738 are controver-
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The dissent correctly acknowledged that the grandfather
clause meant to preserve current embargoes being exercised pur-
suant to section 5(b) of the TWEA.00 It erred, however, in con-
cluding that the purposes of the grandfather clause could be ful-
filled without preserving the right to restrict travel-related
transactions within the context of the existing Cuban embargo
merely because those specific restrictions were not in place on
July 1, 1977. The dissent reached an impermissibly narrow in-
terpretation because it did not fully appreciate the purposes of
the clause.
Congressman Bingham categorically assured the members of
the House that, as a result of the grandfather clause, the amend-
ments to the TWEA would not in any way affect existing embar-
goes. 20 1 There is evidence from the hearings that, in addition to
minimizing the controversial aspects of the bill, Congress en-
acted the grandfather clause to protect the President's exercise
of foreign policy in two important ways. First, in order to con-
tinue an embargo, the executive branch would not be required to
declare a new state of emergency that might jeopardize sensitive
foreign relationships. 202 Second, the President would not be re-
quired to give up any existing sanctions against another nation
because they might serve as bargaining chips in future negotia-
tions.2 03 These purposes would be subverted if the current exer-
cise of the power "to regulate property transactions" were not
sial - particularly the total U.S. trade embargoes of Cuba and Vietnam. The
committee considered carefully whether to revise, or encourage the President to
revise, such existing uses of international economic transaction controls, and
thereby the policies they reflect, in this legislation. The committee decided that to
revise current uses, and to improve policies and procedures that will govern future
uses, in a single bill would be difficult and divisive. Committee members con-
cluded that improved procedures for future uses of emergency international eco-
nomic powers should take precedence over changing existing uses. By
"grandfathering" existing uses of these powers, without either endorsing or dis-
claiming them, H.R. 7738 adheres to the committee's decision to try to assure
improved future uses rather than remedy possible past abuses.
HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 9-10.
200. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3046. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
201. Id. at 3037 (quoting remarks of Rep. Jonathan Bingham, 123 CONG. REC. 38,
166 (1977)).
202. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3031-32 (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat.
1625, 1625-26, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) note (1982)).
203. See Emergency Controls Hearings, supra note 36, at 19, 103, 113, 119.
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being viewed to include authority, withdrawing permission to
engage in travel-related transactions. Since an embargo against
Cuba was in effect on July 1, 1977, the President would not be
able to freely use it as a negotiating tool without the authority to
modify its terms.
2. Travel Restrictions Were Being Exercised with Respect
to Cuba on July 1, 1977
Executive authority to amend regulation 560 existed, not
only because it was inherent in the grandfathered power to regu-
late property transactions, but also because specific restrictions
on travel-related transactions were in place on July 1, 1977.204
On that date, "all transactions ordinarily incident to travel to
and from Cuba" were being exempted from the prohibition of
201(b) of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. °5 However, it
is critically important to recognize that some travel restrictions
existed on July 1, 1977. There was a one-hundred dollar per per-
son limit on the amount of merchandise that a person could
purchase in Cuba and import as accompanied baggage. In addi-
tion, the merchandise authorization was restricted to goods for
personal use. 20 6 This limited permission to purchase goods could
only be used once every six months.207 All persons who engaged
in travel-related transactions were required to make a "full and
accurate record of each such transaction" and keep those records
available for a two-year minimum span.208 The existence of these
specific restrictions alone clearly rebuts the dissent's position
that restrictions on travel-related transactions were not being
exercised on July 1, 1977.
3. Chinese Embargo Distinguished from Cuban Embargo
The dissent in Regan v. Wald examined our trade relations
with China to prove that it was unthinkable that the existence
204. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (setting forth the provisions of regu-
lation 560).
205. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977) (amended 1982) (current version reprinted in 31
C.F.R. § 560 (1984)).
206. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
207. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(3) (1984).
208. 31 C.F.R. § 515.601 (1984).
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of a general license authorizing trade constituted a legitimate
basis for reinstituting trade restrictions without complying with
IEEPA procedures..2 9 The dissent pointed to a House report
that stated that a 1971 general license, which eliminated almost
all restriction on trade with China had the effect of lifting the
trade embargo against that country.21 0 According to Justice
Blackmun, "in eyes of Congress, the President was no longer ex-
ercising § 5 (b) authorities with respect to trade with China even
though a nullified general prohibition was still in place." 211
Thus, the dissent argued that all subsequent controls on trade
with China would be subject to the new IEEPA procedures.212
However, the dissent reached this conclusion without any con-
crete support; the legislative history is at best ambiguous.
The majority in Regan v. Wald did not deal with this argu-
ment, presumably because the issue of whether the President
could have reinstated the Chinese embargo under the grandfa-
ther clause was moot because the President ended the use of
section 5(b) authorities of the TWEA against China in 1980.213
Nevertheless, the status of the general license altering the Chi-
nese embargo is distinguishable from the license that imple-
mented the trade embargo with Cuba. These differences are so
substantial that little can be inferred from a comparison of our
trade relations with China and the exercise of section 5(b) au-
thority against Cuba.
First, United States relations with China were vastly differ-
ent from relations with Cuba. The purpose of the TWEA was to
prevent the United States from aiding its enemies by keeping
currency or property of any kind held in the United States from
reaching the enemy. 21' Although United States relations with
China normalized throughout the last decade, relations with
Cuba have remained strained and, in fact, have further deterio-
rated due to increased Cuban efforts to destabilize governments
throughout the Western Hemisphere.2 15 Thus, the President did
209. See Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3048 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 3048 n.7.
214. 55 CONG. REc. 4858 (1917) (remarks of Rep. Snook).
215. See Joint Appendix at 178-79, Wald (No. 83-436) (declaration of James H.
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not have any reason to use the TWEA to reinstitute a complete
trade embargo against China.
Second, the license authorizing travel-related transactions
with Cuba did not have the effect of removing all section 5(b)
regulation of property transactions with that country.216 On July
1, 1977, those transactions were still subject to the general pro-
hibition of Regulation 201(b).21 7 However, on July 1, 1977 most
property-related transactions with China were exempt from the
general prohibition of trade with China.2 18 There was a limited
exception to this situation of virtual free trade. Chinese assets
under United States jurisdiction before May 8, 1971, continued
to be blocked. 21 9 However, this restriction was miniscule when
compared with those in effect against Cuba.
Finally, in the case of Cuba the authority to regulate travel-
related economic transactions was being exercised on July 1,
1977. Restrictions on travel-related transactions with China were
nonexistent.220 Thus, the United States trade embargo with
China is distinguishable from the trade embargo with Cuba and
does not support a narrow reading of the grandfather clause,
which would indicate that the authority to regulate travel-re-
lated economic transactions with Cuba was not grandfathered.
4. Deference Is Accorded to the Executive in the Realm of
Foreign Affairs
Because the President's authority to regulate travel-related
economic transactions with Cuba was grandfathered 221 his au-
thority was at its maximum; the President acted pursuant to the
express authorization of Congress under section 5(b) of the
TWEA.2 2 The dissent erred when it stated that the President's
Michel).
216. For a brief discussion of the regulations that remained in effect, see supra note
50.
217. For the text of regulation 201(b), see supra note 28.
218. 31 C.F.R. §500.546(b) (1977), removed, 45 Fed. Reg. 7224 (1980).
219. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3048 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting HoUsE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 6).
220. Id.
221. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3034-35; 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
222. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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exercise of authority fell within Justice Jackson's third category
mentioned in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.22 3 When
the President acts pursuant to the express or implied will of
Congress, as he did in Regan v. Wald and Dames & Moore v.
Regan, his authority is at its fullest and the Court must give him
great deference.224 The President exercised his section 5(b) au-
thorities in response to the increased tensions between the
United States and Cuba when he revoked the 1977 general li-
cense, which had allowed United States citizens to engage in
travel-related economic transactions with Cuba.2 ' 5 Applying Jus-
tice Jackson's analysis, the Court must give the executive branch
the usual deference it generally receives in the realm of foreign
affairs. 2 6
Although the prohibition of travel-related economic transac-
tions with Cuba in Regan v. Wald may coincidentally infringe
on the right to travel, it does not obliterate the petitioner's right
to travel.22 7 Thus, revoking the general license that permitted
travel-related economic transactions with Cuba did not violate
the petitioners' right to travel under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.22 8 Rather, this action was simply an exer-
cise of executive authority to regulate property transactions with
a foreign country. Thus, it is not surprising that absent explicit
unambiguous Congressional intent to the contrary, the Wald
Court deferred to the Executive's judgment in a matter concern-
ing foreign affairs. Petitioners' evidence fell far short of meeting
the burden to overcome the latitude given executive authority in
the realm of foreign affairs.
VI. Conclusion
In Regan v. Wald,2 e the Supreme Court held that because
the grandfather clause of section 5(b) of the TWEA authorized
223. Id. at 637-38.
224. See id. at 635.
225. See Joint Appendix at 107, Wald (No.83-436) (declaration of Myles R. Fre-
chette, Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, Department of State).
226. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 672; United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
227. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1) (1984). See supra note 55.
228. Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3039-40.
229. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
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the President to amend the 1977 general license, thus prohibit-
ing certain travel-related economic transactions with Cuba, the
Executive branch did not exceed the bounds of its authority
with the 1982 amendment of regulation 560, even though the
amendment was not promulgated in accordance with the
IEEPA.3 °
Regan v. Wald demonstrates that the IEEPA did not se-
verely limit the President's authority to invoke peacetime emer-
gency economic sanctions upon foreign countries already subject
to existing embargoes under the authority of section 5(b) of the
TWEA. The grandfather clause served its purpose by neutraliz-
ing the foreign policy implications of prematurely terminating
previously declared national emergencies.23 If Congress wants to
gain more control of executive authority in foreign affairs, Con-
gress must enact more specific statutes that clearly define the
scope of executive authority, even though doing so may embroil
them in controversy. 32 Unless the executive branch acts con-
trary to its constitutional limitations, the Supreme Court will be
obliged to give the executive branch the traditional deference in
the realm of foreign affairs.
Mary Keenan Harrington
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
232. One of the primary motives for the enactment of the grandfather clause was to
eliminate the controversy that a blanket termination of all national emergency powers
might cause. The Committee decided that it would be wiser to improve procedures for
future uses of economic emergency powers than to try to also revise current uses as well.
To do both in a single bill would be divisive and difficult. Congress must not, however, in
an attempt to avoid controversy, enact such explicitly vague statutes that they leave it to
the courts to legislate.
Thus, a subsequent attempt to read into a statute an exact meaning when exactness
was purposefully avoided can only be described as a legal fiction. Nunez, The Nature of
Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents As Extrinsic Aids to Statutory
Interpretation: A Re-Examination, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 128, 131-135 (1972).
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